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TRADING WITH SOCIALIST PARTNERS
Josef Rohlik*
Some progress, however limited, in cooperation between Socialist
nations and the Western nations and in particular significant contacts
between the Nixon Administration and Socialist "super powers" and
some other Socialist states, e.g., Romania, led recently to renewed inter-
est within the American legal community in the law of Socialist nations
and in the legal framework of trade relations with these countries. A
rather pressing need for raw materials and for development of new
markets for some American producers, coupled with the favorable gov-
ernmental policy towards "East-West" trade, may stimulate an in-
crease in volume of trade between American exporters and importers
and their Socialist counterparts to the point where such trade could be
of economic, rather than largely political, significance. The following
remarks are aimed at a few of many problems that may be encountered
by a Western businessman who desires to explore Socialist markets in
Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania.'
I. NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN AND THE FOREIGN TRADE REGIME
Organization and direction of the economy is considered by Marxist
theoreticians to be one of the basic functions of the Socialist state.2 The
state exercises its economic function through establishment of legally
independent economic entities (corporations, enterprises, etc.)3 which
are authorized to engage in activities specifically set forth in their "arti-
*Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University, LL.B., Ju. Dr. (Charles University,
Prague), LL.M. (Columbia University). These remarks were delivered at the University of Georgia
School of Law on January 3, 1974.
'Practically identical concepts of economic planning, state monopoly of foreign trade and func-
tions, and subordination of enterprises engaged in foreign trade that exist in the Soviet Union,
Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic,
Hungarian People's Republic and Socialist Republic of Romania permit generalizations. Although
the same could apply to Albania, its minimal contacts with the West and insufficient information
about trading conditions with Albanian enterprises justify exclusion of Albania. Yugoslav compa-
nies engaged in foreign trade enjoy a greater degree of independence within the national economic
plan, and this makes it inappropriate to compare them with foreign trade enterprises in other East
European Socialist countries.
It should be noted that in the following remarks this writer will draw on his experience as former
counsel of a Czechoslovak foreign trade corporation. Nevertheless what will be said about Czecho-
slovakia applies by analogy to the other Socialist countries discussed.
'THEORIE STATU A PRAVA (Theory of State and Law) 20 (Boguszak ed., Prague 1969).
'In addition, the socialist state "encourages and approves of' the establishment of various
cooperatives. In some Socialist countries a few marketing organizations of certain nonagricultural
cooperatives are authorized to engage in export-import trade.
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cles of incorporation;" through the national economic plan, approved
by the government and the legislature, which prescribes limits and goals
of production and distribution of goods and resources and operations
of the Socialist enterprises; through direct supervision of the activity of
these enterprises by governmental bodies;4 and last, but not least,
through constant participation in policy decisions of these enterprises by
the apparatus of the Communist Party on central and local levels.
In the area of foreign trade Socialist states have established so-called
foreign trade organizations (or enterprises or corporations) entrusted
with export-import activities in a given area.5 Each foreign trade organi-
zation buys good to be exported from a national manufacturing com-
pany or other concern and sells imported goods to a national corporate
buyer pursuant to separate contracts governed by the respective national
law. Foreign trade organizations are not agents of their national sellers
and buyers or of the state;' they are independent juridical persons, liable
for their obligations within limits imposed by law of the state of estab-
lishment (incorporation)7 or set forth in published articles of incorpora-
tion. In the U.S.S.R. foreign trade organizations are practically the only
legal entities authorized to enter into foreign trade contracts. In some
of the other Socialist countries, in addition to foreign trade organiza-
tions, already established national companies or combinations of na-
tional companies may be authorized to engage in export-import trade.'
Although it is possible to speculate that, for example, manufacturers
engaged in foreign trade may exhibit greater interest in the best returns
on their exports and in the selection of commercially superior products
needed for their production from abroad than do the foreign trade
organizations, at present, and also for purposes of these remarks, it is
not necessary to distinguish between the activities and the legal regime
'Government, ministries, various inspection commissions, etc. In contractual disputes between
socialist enterprises (including disputes between an enterprise engaged in foreign trade and another
national enterprise) the National Economic Arbitration Tribunal, which has exclusive jurisdiction
over such disputes, must take into account in making its decision the portion of the economic plan
governing operations of the enterprises in question.
'E.g.. foreign trade organization for export and import of motor vehicles or textiles, etc.
'Knapp, The Function. Organization and Activities of Foreign Trade Corporations in the Euro-
pean Socialist Countries, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 52, 53, 61
(Schmitthoff ed., London 1964).
7E.g., certain assets such as real property entrusted to these organizations by the state and
considered inalienable according to the Constitution of the state in question cannot be subject to
claims.
'Art. 7 of Romanian Law No. I of March 17, 1971, On Foreign Trade and Economic Activities,
Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania, I I ILM 161, 162 (1972). See also Grzy-
bowski. The Foreign Trade Regime in the Comecon Countries Today, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. &
PoL. 183, 184-90 (1971).
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of the different types of Socialist enterprises mentioned above.
Each Socialist enterprise engaged in foreign trade is subordinated to
the Ministry of Foreign Trade.9 Top executives of each foreign trade
organization are in daily contact with the officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, and the Minister of Foreign Trade "appoints and
dismisses ... presidents and vice presidents [of the foreign trade organi-
zation]." " There is no doubt that the Ministry of Foreign Trade has the
authority to make any decision concerning export-import operations of
any enterprise engaged in foreign trade."
With respect to its initiative concerning individual foreign partners
and export and import contracts, each foreign trade organization is
confined to the activities prescribed for it in the national five-year eco-
nomic plan and further specified in annual plans within the five-year
planning period. In theory, the plan for each foreign trade organization
is proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade after consultations with
the organization in question. After the necessary approvals, the plan
"becomes an integral part of the uniform state plan of development of
the national economy."'" This means, among other things, that it has
to tie in with that part of the national plan determining the activities of
the national partners of the foreign trade organization. If, for example,
foreign trade organization F is directed by its plan to export 1,000,000
barrels of crude oil in a planning period, then N, national producer of
crude oil, must be directed in its plan to produce 1,000,000 barrels of
crude oil to be sold to F, plus an additional quantity of crude oil to be
sold to domestic users as specified in the plan. Should there be more
than one national producer of crude oil, it must be planned from which
'Art. 5 of the Romanian Law No. I of March 17, 1971, On Foreign Trade and Economic
Activities, Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania, II ILM 161, 162 (1972). Knapp,
supra note 6, at 53, 54. However, national enterprises established for other purposes than conduct
of foreign trade, but subsequently authorized to engage in export-import trade, are also subordi-
nated to the particular ministry in charge of the industry in question. It is this latter ministry which
supervises e.g., production activity, executive personnel, etc. of the enterprise.
'
0Nehemkis and Schdlhammer, International Business Transactions with the Soviet Union and
Mainland China. Prospects and Hazards, 28 Bus. LAW. 17, 30 (1972).
"See the Award of the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission concerning Jordan Invest-
ments, Ltd. v. All-Union Foreign Trade Corporations Sojuzneftexport in Domke, The Israeli-
Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 A.J.I.L. 787, 800-06 (1959). See in particular, point 4 of the Commis-
sion's summary of Sojuzneftexport's answer at 803, and points I and 4 of the "Reasons for the
Award" at 804-05. It should be noted that the Commission emphasized that the Ministry not only
refused to issue the pertinent export license (which would be within the power of a governmental
body anywhere) but "moreover did generally enjoin [Sojuzneftexport] from implementing the con-
tract" (point 4 at 805). In this connection, it should be also noted that in Czechoslovakia export
and import licenses were abolished in 1957 (see Knapp, supra note 6, at 58). Obviously, "issuance
of a license" is only terminus technicus for a particular decision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
"
2Knapp, supra note 6, at 59.
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producer F must buy for export, etc.
The economic plan of each foreign trade organization is itemized in
considerable detail. With respect to each item (goods, services, etc.) the
plan contains descriptions of quality, quantity to be exported and im-
ported, estimate of payments for the total volume of each item to be
imported, estimate of payments received for items exported, etc. The
plan of financial operations of each foreign trade organization, which
includes the plan of accounts payable and accounts receivable for the
planning period, is an integral part of the national budget which in turn
can be called "the financial mirror" of the national economic plan.
Projected receipts and expenditures in convertible currencies are
planned separately. Each foreign trade organization receives an alloca-
tion of convertible currency for planned payments to its Western part-
ners, whereas convertible currency received is transferred to the State.
As can be seen, economic planning in Socialist States is a complex
matter. The plan of each foreign trade organization must correspond to
the economic plans of various national companies. Therefore, the var-
ious factors considered in the preparation of the plan of foreign trade
organizations are of vital importance, especially with respect to the
question whether the plan is based on the projected commercial needs
of their national partners and the needs and tastes of the ultimate con-
sumers.
It is the unquestionable objective of the Socialist states to export to
the West as much as is economically feasible in order to obtain much-
needed convertible currency for imports of technologically sophisticated
capital goods and for imports of goods needed to overcome shortages.' 3
This objective, together with the nature of the described type of eco-
nomic planning, based on arbitrary decisions with respect to a rather
distant future, and with the considerable shortage of convertible cur-
rency experienced by the Socialist states, poses the main difficulty for
the Western businessman. The problem can be best illustrated by an
example:
Since the 1950's there has been a severe shortage of passenger auto-
mobiles in Czechoslovakia. The supply (including imports from the
West and the U.S.S.R. and German Democratic Republic) satisfied
less than 50% of the demand. Ownership of a car has been a matter of
'
3Nehemkis and Sch6llhammer, supra note 10, at 25. It is necessary to differentiate between a
"shortage" contemplated by the Socialist planners and a "shortage" caused by an unforeseen
event, such as a wheat shortage caused by drought. The former is caused by the anticipated inability
of national companies to produce certain goods and hence the supplementary imports of the goods
in question are planned. If the latter is to be alleviated by imports, governmental decision to
authorize imports notwithstanding the plan is required.
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status, a primary desire of a Czechoslovak consumer; the Czechoslo-
vak government has been therefore under considerable popular pres-
sure to increase production of automobiles. Through the 1960's the
increase in production was not commensurate with the increase in
demand. For that reason, the Government devised a special system of
distribution (the term rationing may be more appropriate) of passenger
cars. A national centralized retail outlet called Mototechna was the
only seller of cars to consumers. Mototechna kept lists of applicants
desirous of buying a car. Each applicant had to deposit with Moto-
techna a substantial portion of the price of the car; he was then put
on the waiting list and received his car two to five years after the date
of his deposit. The exorbitant retail price of any car reflected govern-
mental policy to discourage car buyers and bore no relation to produc-
tion costs of the Czechoslovak cars manufactured by enterprises Skoda
and Tatra, or to the import price of the foreign cars. Mototechna
bought passenger automobiles either from the Czechoslovak manufac-
turers or from the importer-a foreign trade organization.
In the 1950's and 1960's the Czechoslovak foreign trade organiza-
tion called Motokov was entrusted with the export and import of
motor vehicles. Motokov had several divisions (e.g., division of passen-
ger automobiles, division of motorcycles, etc.), each one having a sepa-
rate plan of operations, separate allocation of convertible currency,
etc. Each division had several departments, usually established on the
territorial principle (e.g., Western Europe), and each department had
a sej~arate plan of operations based on the plan of the division. Moto-
kov exported some cars bought from Skoda and Tatra and sold im-
ported cars to Mototechna.
Motokov was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moto-
techna by the Ministry of Internal Trade, and Skoda and Tatra by the
Ministry of Automobile Industry. These ministries along with the Cen-
tral Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance (charged with the
allocation of convertible currency to foreign trade organizations) and
the appropriate department of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, 4 participated in the preparation of the national eco-
nomic plan of production, export and import and national distribution
of passenger automobiles. They had to decide the following items: (i)
the goal of production of the Czechoslovak producers, 5 and within the
plan of production, the volume to be sold to Motokov for export and
to Mototechna for sales to consumers; (ii) the goal of national
distribution by Mototechna, whose plan included detailed descriptions
"Cf. art. I of the Romanian Law No. I of March 17, 1971, On Foreign Trade and Economic
Activities, Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania, I I ILM 161 (1972).
',Needless to say the production plan of Skoda and Tatra had to coincide with the production
plan of'manufacturers of accessories, and so on, ad infinitum.
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of models of cars to be sold on the national market, since Mototechna
had to be able to advise the buying public that deposits would be
accepted for, say, Fiat 600's to be imported within the next five year
planning period; (iii) the wholesale and retail prices of automobiles;
and (iv) with respect to Motokov, the allocations of convertible cur-
rency for purchases outside of the Socialist world and the specific
number of cars to be exported and imported, as well as descriptions
of the car models to be imported.
Three major points are demonstrated by this example. First, because
of the interrelationships among various national organizations it is al-
most impossible to achieve any substantial change in the" plan affecting
a particular foreign trade organization while the national economic plan
is in operation without rewriting the whole plan. Second, each foreign
trade organization has practically all its future contracts with national
suppliers and buyers, including price terms, already worked out in the
plan. And third, because of the designation of goods to be imported,
each foreign trade organization has a limited choice of its foreign trad-'
ing partners.
The Socialist planner's decision as to which goods to import is based
on a combination of economic, commercial and political factors, one of
which may occasionally prevail. Obviously, if a technologically ad-
vanced product can be obtained in one Western country only and if that
product is considered vital for the development of the Socialist econ-
omy, the foreign trade organization will buy the product from the seller
in the country in question. On the other hand, if products planned to
be imported are obtainable from a variety of sources in the West, in
addition to the usual commercial considerations the following political
considerations may become determinative as to the decisions which
product and from where to buy: (i) General political considerations.
Usually Socialist countries prefer to import goods from Western states
with which they maintain friendly relations. In the late 1950's and early
1960's imports from France were favored over imports from Great
Britain, whereas imports from the Federal Republic of Germany were
confined exclusively to plant equipment and other technologically ad-
vanced products. (ii) Political Considerations related to trade condi-
tions. Availability of credit and various restrictions on imports from and
exports to Socialist states or otherwise unfavorable attitude to East-
West trade'" figure prominently among these considerations. Also, a
commitment to increase imports from particular Western countries in
return for various concessions, e.g., tariff concessions, affecting Social-
"See Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 841 (1970).
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ist exports'7 represents a potent reason for designation in the plan of
countries of origin of goods to be imported. Generally speaking, Social-
ist states give considerable preference to export-import trade with West-
ern states with which intergovernmental trade agreements were con-
cluded. It must be emphasized, however, that the Socialist states have
made considerable efforts to reach such agreements with the Western
nations.'
The preceding description of the planning system gives rise to the
conclusion that in practical terms a western businessman can obtain
access to the Socialist markets only to the extent that the state economic
plan permits him to do so. If he is an importer, he has a fair chance to
buy goods from foreign trade organizations unless the Socialist planners
do not plan the export of such goods or unless the foreign trade organi-
zation in question is directed to sell the entire volume of goods else-
where. If he is an exporter, however, his position is considerably more
difficult. Not only must the goods he wants to sell be included in the
plan of imports, but also the foreign trade organization authorized to
import such goods must either be specifically permitted to import these
goods from the state of his business domicile, or-and this does not
happen too often-be free to import them from anywhere. Unless these
conditions exist, no matter how much the foreign trade organization
may like the exporter's goods and commercial terms, he must wait at
least for the next planning period. As to the foreign exporter's chances
"to be included" in the plan, he will be well advised not to rely exclu-
sively on quality etc. of his product, but also to actively seek contacts
not only with the foreign trade organization in question, but also with
the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade or of the Communist
Party."
Once a foreign trade organization decides to buy goods from a partic-
ular Western exporter, it will negotiate the contract. The purchase price,
referred to in the Socialist states as import (export) price, is computed
in convertible currency, usually on a CIF or FOB basis, and more or
"
7See Comment, East- West Trade: The Accession of Poland to the GATT, 24 STAN. L. REV.
748, 754-58 (1972).
"With respect to Soviet initiative in the 1950's and 1960's vis-i-vis the United States, see
Professor Berman's comment The US-USSR Trade Agreement From a Soviet Perspective, 67
A.J.I.L. 516, 519 (1973). Two prominent Czechoslovak authors in a study on the principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states wrote: "Socialist...
countries rank economic and trade cooperation second only to the maintenance of international
peace and security." (Potocny and Myslil, Legal Principles of Peaceful Coexistences 235 (English
Translation, Prague, 1969)).
"Comment, Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures with Socialist Business Associations:
The Hungarian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752, 754 (1973).
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less reflects a foreign market price.2" Customs duties of the importing
state are paid by the Socialist importer who simply transfers the respec-
tive amount from his account in national currency to the state. That
financial transaction is purely technical and the tariff rate does not enter
into consideration with respect to the import (export) price.2' The na-
tional corporate buyer has to buy pursuant to the economic plan all the
goods in question from the importer (foreign trade organization) for the
price expressed in the national currency. As has been mentioned above,
the retail price charged by the national buyer is planned well in advance
of the particular transaction between the Western exporter and the
foreign trade organization, and is wholly unrelated to the import price.
In that sense, the Western exporter does not have to worry whether
goods from the state of his business domicile enjoy status under a most-
favored-nation regime or not. The role of most-favored-nation regime
is to put foreign goods and foreign exporters which enjoy it into exactly
the same position on the national market, at least as to tariffs, so that
they can compete for the national consumers particularly on the basis
of the quality and price of their goods and services. But how can a
particular western exporter effectively compete with the others if the
Socialist planners arbitrarily decide in advance how much the foreign
trade organizations will buy from each of them, or possibly exclude one
or more exporters at all?22 The prevailing answer is that "In the light of
experience of the years since the emergence of state trading the
conclusion seems inescapable that the most-favored-nation clause can-
not achieve an increase in trade, as it was originally intended to do
... "2 Indeed, the most-favored-nation clause, taken out of the con-
text of an intergovernmental trade agreement, is of no use to the West-
ern exporter whose goods enjoy the most-favored-nation regime in a
Socialist country pursuant to that clause. It might well have been of no
use, even in the context of East-West trade agreements, "since the
mln the case of Socialist exports, the Socialist states have been in the past confronted with
allegations of "dumping" since the national manufacturer's wholesale price is arbitrarily set by
the state authorities and cannot be in any reasonable way related to the asking price (in convertible
currency) of the foreign trade organization. See supra note 17, at 749-52.
2 Rohlik, K Nekterjm Otizktm Valorizace Kupni Ceny Podle NaYeho Novbho Zhkon'tku Me-
zinuirodn'iho Obchodu (The Problem of Revalorization of the Purchase Price according to the New
Law on Foreign Trade) 9 CZECHOSLOVAK J. OF INT'L L. 65, 71 (1965). According to § 347 of the
Czechoslovak Law No. 101/1963 Sb. (Collection of Statutes), "Unless otherwise agreed . . .
customs duties . . . and other costs related to imports shall be borne by the buyer."
"Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies: The Soviet
American Example, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 482, 501 (1959).
z'Domke and Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 A.J.I.L. 55, 67
(1958).
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emergence of state trading", i.e., since the Russian revolution of 1917,
because the prevailing political and economic conditions were not favor-
able to "East-West" trade. However, if we assume that these conditions
are undergoing a process of change, we may speculate that the most-
favored-nation clause in an East-West trade agreement may favorably
affect all its beneficiaries, although in a different sense than we under-
stand it in a free market economy.
As has been mentioned above, Socialist states prefer to trade with
Western states with which they have concluded intergovernmental trade
agreements. It can be safely said that at present an overwhelming ma-
jority of such agreements among friendly states include a most-favored-
nation clause. For the Socialist states and particularly for the Soviet
Union, the grant of most-favored-nation treatment is not only of eco-
nomic significance24 but also of political significance, a matter of princi-
ple. As Professor Berman puts it, "[most-favored-nation treatment]-
in its proper sense of nondiscrimination-is a matter of national pride:
indeed, the Soviets, with some justification, consider our tariff
discrimination against their exports to be a violation of international
law." 5 Thus, it seems to be at least justified to suggest that if the Soviet
Union is finally granted most-favored-nation regime in the United
States, and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Trade of October 18,
197226 becomes wholly operative, 7 the American exporter will have a
better chance to penetrate the Soviet market by the mere fact that the
Agreement was concluded, and the same should apply by analogy to
other Socialist countries. Moreover, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on
Trade contains what this writer considers to be some specific Soviet
commitments in this direction. According to article 2, paragraph, I of
the Agreement, "Both governments will take appropriate measures
... . to encourage and facilitate the exchange of goods and services
between the two countries on the basis of mutual advantage . . . . In
expectation of such joint efforts, both governments envision that total
bilateral trade in comparison with the period 1969 - 1971 will at least
triple over the three year period comtemplated by this Agreement."
"See Starr, A New Legal Framework for Trade Between the United States and the Soviet
Union: The 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement, 67 A.J.I.L. 63, 68, 69 (1973).
"Berman, supra note 18, at 520. Compare Domke and Hazard, supra note 23, at 66 (citing
unpublished study of Erler and Zieger).
267 DEP'T STATE BULL. 595 (1972). For an analysis of the Agreement and related matters see
Grzyhowski. United States-Soviet Union Trade Agreement of 1972, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
395 (1972) and Starr, supra note 24.
'As of this writing there has been a considerable congressional opposition to the grant of most-
favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist states.
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Paragraph 4 of the same article states, "The Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics expects that, during the period of effective-
ness of this Agreement, foreign trade organizations of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics will place substantial orders in the United
States of America for machinery, plant and equipment, agricultural
products, industrial products and consumer goods produced in the
United States of America." 8 Pursuant to article 5 the U.S.A. may
establish a Commercial Office in Moscow and the U.S.S.R. may estab-
lish a Trade Representation in Washington. According to the White
House Fact Sheet the U.S. Commercial office is expected to ".
provide the U.S. business community with up-to-date information on
Soviet markets, facilitate introductions of U.S. businessmen to the ap-
propriate Soviet ministries . ". .. I' According to article 6 of the Agree-
ment, American business firms may open their representations in the
U.S.S.R. and Soviet foreign trade organizations may establish their
offices in the U.S.A.
The most-favored-nation clause appears in article 1 of the Agree-
ment. It is the so-called general most-favored-nation clause, since in
addition to customs duties and "charges of any kind" (art. I § 1(a)), it
includes internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use (art. I §
1(b)), charges imposed upon the international transfer of payments for
importation or exportation (art. 1 § 1(c)), and rules and formalities in
connection with importation or exportation (art. 1 § 1(d)). Paragraph 2
of the same article provides for equitable shares of exports (imports) in
the event that either government applies quantitative restrictions. Para-
graph 3 incorporates exceptions with regard to privileges granted to
neighboring countries, to developing countries under 1968 UNCTAD
Resolution 21 (11), or with respect to any action permitted under exist-
ing multilateral agreements.
Although, as has been emphasized above, the most-favored-nation
clause in itself does not assure either free access to the Soviet market
or "inclusion" of American goods into the Soviet plan of imports, it
would seem that use of a clause such as that employed in the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Agreement on Trade, especially when read in the context of
the Agreement, would at least stimulate the Soviet government to plan
an increase of Soviet imports from the U.S.A. in relation to possible
increase of imports from other Western countries with which similar
2
"Soviet commitment to purchase goods of certain value within a specified period already accom-
panied Soviet-American trade agreements in the 1930's. See Domke and Hazard, supra note 23,
at 57.
1167 DEP'T STATE BULL. 593 (1972).
1974]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
agreements were concluded.A
Finally, a speculation that the rigid system of planning in the Socialist
states will change does not seem to be out of order. Already in the early
1960's a prominent Soviet economist, Lieberman, and an equally promi-
nent Czechoslovak economist, Sik, advocated more freedom and inde-
pendence for Socialist enterprises. Romania and Hungary are actually
seeking Western investment in their respective countries (see infra). The
Soviet phobia about "capitalist encirclement" and hostility seems to be
fading with the improved political and economic position of the USSR
and, correspondingly, the Soviet desire to engage in a meaningful. trade
with the West seems to be sincere. If the Socialist states can avail
themselves of most-favored-nation regime in the West (hopefully includ-
ing the U.S.A.) and as a result will be able to increase their exports
there, one of the rational reasons for rigid planning of foreign trade-
significant lack of convertible currency-can be alleviated. We may
then see a system of planning according to which each Socialist enter-
prise engaged in the export-import trade will be allocated a certain
volume of convertible currency (dependent on their real needs or on
their profits from exports), which these enterprises will be permitted to
use more or less freely, according to their own commercial judgment.
If the contemporary East-West trade agreements contribute to such
changes, the initial advantage of the Soviet exporter under the most-
favored-nation regime (access to Western markets) and the lack of
reciprocity as to the free access of the Western exporter to the Soviet
market due to the system of planning, will more than offset. After all,
it should be remembered that there are around three hundred million
people in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe who need not only Ameri-
can wheat and Western technology, but who are literally hungry for
Western automobiles, textiles and other consumer products and who, in
contrast to the situation in some developing countries, are sophisticated
enough to avail themselves of the opportunity to buy, should it arise. 31
II. EXPORT-IMPORT CONTRACTS AND LAW IN SOCIALIST STATES
The Socialist states which emerged after a series of"coups d'6tat"in
Eastern Europe in the late 1940's absorbed very quickly the Soviet
"model" of regulation of national economy; 3 the same cannot be said
3 In that sense only does this writer share Professor Berman's view as to the significance of the
most-favored-nation clause extending beyond customs duties. See Berman, supra note 18, at 521,
and Berman, supra note 22, at 525, n.133.
3'See also McQuade, U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe; Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW
& Pot.. INT'L Bus. 42, 44-51 (1971).
:1Supra note I.
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about commercial law (as opposed to public law). The Soviet Union
after the 1917 revolution had "abolished" the overwhelming majority
of prior statutes, and-development of the new Socialist law resulted in
a rather fragmentary system. A multitude of gaps was filled by decisions
of courts and administrative agencies which considered the "will of the
proletariat," in the absence of statute, as a source of law, and although
the situation improved since the 1960's, Soviet law can hardly be consid-
ered to be a model of clarity and normative precision. At present, the
Principles of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics
of 1961, the Principles of the Law of Civil Procedure of the U.S.S.R.
and Union Republics of 1961, Civil Codes of Soviet Republics, adminis-
trative regulations and international agreements are the principal
sources of Soviet law applicable to foreign trade contracts.13 The So-
viet forum for litigation arising out of such contracts,34 which for all
practical purposes is the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion, :" routinely applies recognized commercial customs in addition to
the law, whether Soviet or foreign, governing a contract in question
before it.36 Generally speaking, the Commission has a good reputation;
its arbitrators do not lack expertise, and its awards contain well-rea-
soned opinions.
Most of the other Socialist states, in particular Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic and Poland did not break too quickly
3 Lunz, Conflict of Laws in International Sale: Theory and Practice of Socialist Countries, 114
RECUEIIL DES COURS DE LA HAYE 5, 7-9 (1965).
:"Id. at 5-7.
"The Commission is constituted and operates within the All-Union Chamber of Commerce.
Similar Foreign Trade Arbitration Commissions exist in other Socialist countries (as part of
respective Chambers of Commerce). See Grzybowski, Arbitral Tribunals for Foreign Trade in
Socialist Countries, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 592 (1972). Soviet foreign trade organizations
have usually insisted on the Commission as the forum in arbitration clauses in export-import
contracts. However, according to article 7, paragraph I of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Agreement on Trade
(supra) both governments will encourage adoption of arbitration for settlement of disputes arising
out of commercial contracts between American businessmen and Soviet foreign trade organiza-
tions; the arbitration clauses should "provide for arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the
Economic Commission for Europe of January 20, 1966;" the arbitrations should be held "in a
country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that
is a party to the 1958 [New York] Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards."
It should be noted that the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commissions in the U.S.S.R. and other
Socialist countries do, of course, have jurisdiction only in accordance with arbitration clauses. In
other words-although in foreign trade it is not of practical significance-foreign parties have
access to courts of general jurisdiction in these countries.
38Berman, supra note 22, at 493. Kitagawa, Legal Aspects of Soviet-Japanese Trade, 37 LAW
& CONTENIP. PROB. 557, 565 (1972). Lunz, supra note 33, at 12, 13. Ramzaitsev, The Law Applied
h Arbitration Tribunals, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 138, 151
(Schmitthoffed.. London 1964).
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with their long tradition of legal culture, based on the philosophy of
European positivism and for the most part expressed in concise and well
structured civil codes. East Germany retained the old German Civil
Code (Bfirgerliches Gestezbuch), and Czechoslovakia adopted a new
Civil Code in 1950, modelled on the old Austrian Civil Code of 1811,
with but a few changes which were relatively insignificant in practice.
However, the reality of life in the Socialist countries required substan-
tial changes. On one hand, the state's monopoly of industry, trade, etc.
and the system of economic planning required special rules governing
relations between national enterprises based on the economic plan, and
on the other hand, infrequent and simple contracts between citizens
required simple regulations. As a consequence, in 1964 Czechoslovakia
adopted new Civil and Economic codes,37 and Poland, on January 1,
1965, substituted a new Civil Code for its Code of Obligations of 1933
and Commercial Code of 1934.38 At the same time, it was recognized
that new simplistic civil codes could not govern sophisticated foreign
trade contracts with Western businessmen. 9 Therefore, Poland re-
tained in force certain provisions of the 1934 Commercial Code,40
whereas Czechoslovakia adopted in 1963 a modern International Trade
Code (law No. 101/1963 Sb.)4' based on traditional concepts. In addi-
tion, Czechoslovakia and Poland adopted new codes of private interna-
tional law (conflict of laws). 2 Of course, in all Socialist countries, aside
from private law, various statutes and administrative regulations gov-
erning activities of foreign trade organizations, banking, foreign ex-
change, customs duties, authority of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, etc.
are important sources of each national law applied to foreign trade
contracts. And as in the U.S.S.R., application of these administrative
regulations, of private law (whether respective national law or foreign
law) and of commercial customs by the Foreign Trade Arbitration Tri-
bunals did not lead to objectionable results - quite the contrary. Accord-
:"See Vasek, Survey of Czechoslovak Laws Affecting East-West Trade, 20 AM. J. COMP. L.
453, 454-56 (1972).
"'Sadowski, The Law of Foreign Trade in the Polish People's Republic, 37 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 506, 523 (1972).
"For the most part, the export-import contracts between foreign trade organizations of different
Socialist countries, members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), are
governed by the 1958 unification convention (as amended in 1968)-the General Conditions for
the Delivery of Goods.
'"Sadowski, supra note 38, at 529.
"See Vasek, supra note 37, at 456-460.
"Iln Czechoslovakia Law of December 4, 1963 No. 97/1963 Sb. on Private International Law
and Procedure. Its choice of law rules are very similar to those of the prior Law on Private
International Law No. 41/1948 Sb. which was drafted in the 1930's. Poland's new Code of Private
International Law came into force on July I, 1966 and replaced the Code of 1926.
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ingly, it is the opinion of this writer that if a Western businessman has
to resort to contract litigation in the Socialist states, he will be "sub-
jected" to fair treatment. The law applied by the Arbitration Tribunal
is determined according to acceptable standards discussed below; if it
happens to be the law of the Socialist state in question, its rules will by
no means be found extravagant and will differ in each Socialist state.
In this connection it is necessary to emphasize that mere difference, even
perhaps a striking difference, between a provision of law of a Socialist
state and, say, a provision of law concerning the same subject as we
know it in this country does not make that provision objectionable to
the extent that it would be below the limits of tolerance. For example,
Soviet insistence on application of Soviet mandatory rules concerning
the form of a contract even if the lex causae (the law governing the
contract) and lex loci contractus (the law of the place of making of the
contract) is a foreign law, is peculiar. At the same time it can be hardly
called more objectionable than notoriously known application of our
antitrust laws to a contract concluded by aliens outside of U.S. territory.
The following is a brief look at some principles of law of certain
Socialist states which may affect export-import contracts.
Legal Capacity and the Form of Foreign Trade Contracts
As has been emphasized above, only those Socialist enterprises with
specific authorization from the state can engage in foreign trade, and
then only within the limits of their authorization. In accordance with
the well-established Socialist principle of private international law all
Socialist countries that the legal capacity of a person is governed by the
lex personalis, the legal capacity of the Socialist enterprises is deter-
mined by the law of their business domicile. In the case of Socialist
enterprises it is not necessary-for obvious reasons-to distinguish
between siege social and place of incorporation as determinative cri-
teria. Accordingly, it is the law of the business domicile of each Socialist
enterprise which will determine whether the enterprise is authorized to
engage in foreign trade in general and whether it did or did not act ultra
vires with respect to a particular transaction. It is that law which must
be consulted to determime the liability of a Socialist enterprise for the
actions of its organs and agents.
With respect to the formal validity of export-import contracts, it is
possible to state in very general terms, and with due regard to the
exceptions stated below, that (i) the contracting parties must comply
with the mandatory rules of the lex causae (the law governing the con-
tract) affecting formal validity of the contract, and (ii) in all other
respects it is sufficient that the form of the contract satisfies the lex loci
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contractus or, as specifically provided for in some Socialist states, that
the form of the contract satisfies directory rules of the lex causae. This
rule applies in Poland 3 and Czechoslovakia,44 and neither Polish nor
Czechoslovak laws prescribe any special form for international contract
of sale.45 In the U.S.S.R. the aforementioned rule would be partially
applied in exceptional circumstances when the lex causae would contain
stricter mandatory requirements as to the form of a contract than did
Soviet law. 6 For example, if the lex causae conditioned validity of a
contract on affixation of a seal, a written agreement without a seal
would not suffice. Otherwise, the situation in the Soviet Union is quite
different from that in Czechoslovakia and Poland. All foreign trade
contracts to which a Soviet foreign trade organization is a party must
be in writing and must be duly signed by two authorized representatives
(usually one signature must be that of the chief executive officer of the
organization or of his deputy), whose names appear in a publication of
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, called Vneshniaia Torgovlia.47 Accord-
ing to article 14 of the Principles of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R.
and Union Republics, failure to observe these requirements results in
nullity of the contract. Exchange of forms, letters, etc. with two author-
ized signatures appearing on behalf of the Soviet organization satisfies
the "in writing" requirement."
It has been suggested that "[I]t may be embarrassing to request a
Soviet official to show proof of his authority to bind his organization
." and that it is unlikely that officials of Soviet organizations would
exceed their authority.49 That is probably true. But apart from the ultra
vires issue, 0 the writing requirement has a very important parol evi-
dence aspect. In the case of Schenker and Co. v. V/O Raznoimport, the
French plaintiff based his claim for additional transportation costs on
a promise of the Soviet defendant made orally in France. The Soviet
"Comment, The Polish System of Private International Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 330, 339
(1967).
"§ 4 of the Law No. 97/63 Sb. (Code of Private International Law and Procedure).
,11Bystrick et al., .Privo Mezinbrodniho Obschodu (The Law of International Trade) 331
(Prague, 1967). Sadowski, supra note 38, at 529.
"But see Grzybowski, supra note 26, at 418.
"
7Grzybowski, supra note 26, at 417-19. Lunz, supra note 33, at 43, 44. Nehemkis and Scholl-
hammer, supra note 10, at 33, 34.
"Lunz, supra note 33, at 45.
"Nehemkis and Sch6llhammer, supra note 10, at 34.
lIn the sense of an official exceeding his authority either beyond the scope of the organization's
activity or beyond the scope of his authority within the organization. Assumption of an oral
"contractual" commitment would amount, stricto sensu, to an excess of authority. In that sense,
from the point of legal dogmatics, Soviet foreign trade organizations do not possess legal capacity
to enter into any other but written contract.
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Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission held that "[S]uch oral prom-
ises, if they had been made, were not binding upon the defendant since
all alterations and additional agreements to a contract of foreign trade
to which a Soviet organization is a party are to be made only in writing,
in the same form as the basic contract."'" In Kattenburg v. V/O
Teknoexport, the same rule was applied against the Soviet defendant
who claimed that "[T]he contract should be interpreted in accordance
with the oral negotiations which took place at the time when the
transaction was concluded." 5
In this connection it may be interesting to note that according to the
Czechoslovak Code of Foreign Trade a contract must be interpreted in
accordance with the intention of the contracting parties and negotiations
between them, and in accordance with the prior dealing between the
same parties; in addition, a contract may be supplemented by interna-
tional customs generally observed in the particular trade, provided that
such customs are consistent with the contractual terms and the Code. 3
In Bulgaria, legal requirements as to capacity and form seem to be
even more stringent than those in the Soviet Union. A Bulgarian foreign
trade organization may conclude a foreign trade contract only with the
permission of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and only in a written
form. 4
In general, it may be said that foreign trade organizations in all
Socialist countries insist on written contracts, whether it is necessary or
not. However, in dealing with Soviet or Bulgarian partners, Western
businessmen should be aware that their contracts will be interpreted by
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commissions of these countries strictly in
accordance with the written terms.
The Law of the Contract
All Socialist states adopted the principle of autonomy of will of the
parties; i.e., parties to a foreign trade contract are free to choose the
"proper law of the contract," called lex causae, within the limits im-
posed by each national law. In the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia this
freedom of the parties is unrestricted;55 according to the Polish Code of
"Lunz, supra note 33, at 44.
1"1d. at 44, 45.
:¢§ 23, 118 of the Code of International Trade No. 101/63 Sb. Bystrick. et al., supra note 45,
at 34, 230, 231. Compare UCC § 2-202.
"Sipkov. The Law of Foreign Trade in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 37 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 485, 497, 498 (1972).
"
5 Lunz, supra note 33, at 32. § 9(l) of the Czechoslovak Code of Private International Law and
Procedure No. 97/63 Sb. In contrast. § 9 of the old Czechoslovak Code of Private International
Law No. 41/48 Sb. required that the chosen law must have a substantial connection with the
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Private International Law, parties to a contract "may subject their
transaction to a system of law with which the transaction is con-
nected.""' The same rule applies in Hungary. 7 As to the other Socialist
countries, relatively few arbitration decisions in this area make any
positive conclusion too speculative; the same would apply, mutatis
mutandis with respect to choice of law perfactam concludentiarn infra.
According to section 9(1) of the Czechoslovak Code of Private Interna-
tional Law and Procedure parties may choose the law of the contract
either expressis verbis or per factam concludentiam. In section 9(2) of
the same Code renvoi is excluded, unless otherwise indicated by the
parties. The same applies to the Soviet Union." Professor Lunz seems
to indicate that according to practice in the other Socialist states the
choice of law can be equally inferred from the conduct of the parties. 9
At least one author has concluded otherwise as to Poland.60
If the parties fail to choose the law of the contract for the sale of
goods, Foreign Trade Arbitration Commissions in the U.S.S.R. and
Romania will apply lex loci contractus.6 ' As in other Socialist countries,
locus contractus in a contract inter absentes is the place where the
offeror received the acceptance. In East Germany the law of the seller's
business domicile will be applied.62 The Hungarian Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration Commission applies the law of the seller's business domicile, or
the law of the buyer's business domicile; the latter choice is made if the
place of performance is within the state of buyer's business domicile, or
if goods at the time when the contract was made were situated within
the territory of buyer's state, or if the contract was made on the territory
of buyer's state." The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion applies either lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis.4 In Poland,
the law of the seller's business domicile will be applied to contract for
sale. Different choice of law criteria will determine the law governing
other contracts. 5 The Czechoslovak Code of Private International Law
contract and must not contradict the mandatory rules of the law which would otherwise govern
the contract according to the Code.
:"Supra note 43, at 347.
:'1Lunz, supra note 33, at 29.
"Id. at 30, 34. According to Lunz, tacit choice of law can be found only if parties satisfactorily
prove their intentions. In other words choice of law perfactam concludentiam is not tantamount
to finding of "hypothetical will" of the parties. As to Czechoslovakia, see infra.
"11d. at 29.
'"Supra note 43, at 347.
"Lunz, supra note 33, at 31, 34.
"Id. at 31.
63Id.
"Sipkov, supra note 54, at 499.
"Comment, supra note 43, at 347, 348.
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and Procedure adopted a rather interesting approach based on the "cen-
ter of gravity" doctrine. Section 10 of the Code reads:
(I) If the parties do not choose the governing law, their rights and
obligations shall be governed by the law whose application is in keep-
ing with a reasonable settlement of the respective legal relationship.
(2) Usually
(a) contract of sale of goods . . . is governed by the law of the place
where the seller . . . is domiciled at the time when the contract was
made."
In Koospol v. Arthur Lafont et Fils the parties failed to stipulate
expressly the law of the contract. The Czechoslovak plaintiff alleged
that the parties had tacitly chosen the Czechoslovak law, as evidenced
by the choice of the forum clause. The Turkish defendant denied that
allegation. The decision of the arbitrators, rendered on October
13,1966, contains the following paragraph:
[T]he contract is written in French and was signed in Izmir, i.e., in
Turkey. The seller is a Turkish juridical person and the place of per-
formance is Izmir. In the arbitration clause in the contract the parties
designated the Arbitration Court of the Czechoslovak Chamber of
Commerce as the forum for settlement of their disputes. The Arbitra-
tors, in accordance with the prevailing doctrine of private international
law and practice of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, view the
choice of the forum as only one, even if important, connection to be
considered in determination of the law of the contract. The choice of
the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce could be considered to be
the choice of the Czechoslovak law perfactam concludentiam accord-
ing to section 9 of the Code No. 97/63 Sb. only if other choice of law
criteria did not indicate otherwise. The principle qui eligit judicem
eligit ius is in this case inappropriate since other choice of law criteria
(the place of the making of the contract, lex personalis of the seller,
place of performance, the object of the contract of sale) did refer the
Arbitrators to the Turkish law. Therefore, the Arbitrators concluded
that in accordance with section 10(1) (2a) of the Code, center of gravity
of the contract in question is within the domain of the law of Turkey
and application of Turkish law is in keeping with a reasonable settle-
ment of this matter. 7
Evidently, the arbitrators "counted" the relevant contracts and relied
on the Code's provision that the contract of sale is usually governed by
the law of the seller's domicile; any effort to explain why the application
"'With respect to other contracts the Code contains different choice of law criteria.
11ROHLIK, LJVOD DO MEZINARODNIHO PRAVA SOUKROMtHO (Introduction to Private In-
ternational Law) 204 (Prague 1968).
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of the Turkish law is in keeping with a reasonable settlement of the
matter, whereas the application of the Czechoslovak law would not be,
is missing.
In all Socialist countries, lexfori can be applied instead of the foreign
law chosen by the parties or the foreign law applicable according to the
conflict rules of the forum pursuant to the "public order" exception or
concept of "evasion of law." Evasion of law is a doctrinal concept not
expressed in the law of Socialist states and the exception has never been
used in decisions concerning foreign trade contracts.
The public order provision of the Czechoslovak Code of Private Inter-
national Law and Procedure is rather typical of the Socialist laws:
§36. A provision of a foreign law cannot be applied if the effects of
such application would be contrary to such principles of social and
state order of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which have to be
observed without reservation."
It has been theorized that this section can be applied only if the effects
of application of a foreign rule would be injurious to the fundamental
moral and legal principles of lexfori; specifically, the section is inapplic-
able if the foreign rule is only different from the mandatory rules of the
law of the forum. 9 To this writer's knowledge the public order exception
has never been applied by the Foreign Trade Commissions of the Social-
ist countries.70
Finally, it should be noted that foreign law is in all Socialist states
treated as "law" and not as "fact." Accordingly, the forum is under the
obligation to ascertain the contents of the foreign law in question even
if the parties do not respond to the invitation to submit to the arbitrators
or to the court a foreign statute or evidence of practice. The arbitrators
or the court can request from its Ministry of Justice an opinion as to
the contents of the foreign law in question.7 If the contents of the
foreign law is not ascertainable, lexfori will be applied instead.
Standard Contracts of Socialist Foreign Trade Organizations
In accordance with the prevailing business usage the Socialist foreign
trade organizations make every effort, at least if they are sellers, to use
standard (form) contracts for the sale of goods with printed conditions
Cf. Lunz, supra note 33, at 32, 33. Sipkov, supra note 54, at 499. Comment, supra note 43, at
335. 336.
"Bystrick9, Les Traits Gbnbraux De La Codification Tschcoslovalue En Droit International
Priv. 123 REcuhil DES COURS DE LA HAVE 413, 448, 449 (1968).
7
'Cf Lunz, supra note 33, at 15.
71§ 53 of the Czechoslovak Code of Private International Law and Procedure. Comment, supra
note 43, at 335.
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on the reverse side of the form. Sometimes these standard contracts may
pose a dilemma for a Western businessman. Printed conditions in the
contract form are approved and very often drafted by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade in each Socialist country and insistence on significant
changes may lead to protracted negotiations, since the representative of
the foreign trade organization will have to seek approval of the Minis-
try. If the Ministry of Foreign Trade does not approve of the proposed
change, the foreign trade organization may abandon its negotiations
with its Western partner rather than to inform him that it simply does
not have authority to renegotiate the change in question. It should be
added that occasionally, in negotiations of a routine transaction, a par-
ticular representative of a foreign trade corporation may lack sufficient
commercial expertise and may not fully understand the effects of a
particular clause in the contract form of his own enterprise, not to speak
of the effects of the proposed change.72
On the other hand, a Western businessman will be well advised to
take a very close look at three clauses-or at least three clauses that
this writer is going to mention-which often appear in the printed form:
the penalty (also called "conventional fine") clause, the "Act of God"
(force majeure) clause and the gold clause.
According to the law of all Socialist countries delivery under a con-
tract for sale must be made at the agreed place of delivery and on or,
with certain exceptions, before the exact date specified in the contract.
A one day delay is already regarded as a breach of contract and under
the penalty clause the seller must pay an agreed fine for each day of
delay in performance.73 The fine may represent a fixed sum of money
or, as is more usual, a percentage of the purchase price payable for each
day of delay up to a certain limit agreed by the parties; the limit may
be as high as 10% of the purchase price.74 Depending on the contents of
the penalty clause, the fine may be imposed on a party for nonconform-
ing performance other than delay.75 Payment of a fine as a deterrent
against delay in delivery is also firmly established in commercial
transactions within Socialist countries. It is very often a statutory rem-
edy available in most Socialist countries to national buyers against
national sellers and it is also a conventional remedy, according to sec.
83 of the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of Comecon.7"
"Cf Nehemkis and Sch6llhammer, supra note 10, at 31.
"Id. at 35.
71/d.
71Kitagawa, supra note 36, at 562.
71According to § 83 the maximum amount of the penalty is 8% "of the value of the goods not
delivered on time." An English translation of the General Conditions (1968 revised version) can
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It is a direct consequence of the Socialist system of planning and
subordination that the specific performance of a foreign trade organiza-
tion is excused if it is made impossible by the decision of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade or by a change in the national economic plan. The
crucial question, therefore, is whether in these cases the Socialist obligor
is liable for damages. In the infamous Soviet-Israeli Oil Arbitration,"
the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission denied damages to
the Israeli buyer pursuant to a questionable interpretation of a force
majeure clause in the contract.7" The decision seems to indicate that at
the very least that Arbitration Commission will require specific lan-
guage in the contract to rule otherwise. On the other hand, it means that
the Western buyer can protect himself, if he succeeds in obtaining a
stipulation in the contract which would specifically mention that "a
change in the economic plan or a decision of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade does not relieve the Socialist obligor of his liability for dam-
ages.""9
It is not at all unusual to see a gold clause in the form contract of a
Socialist seller.8 0 According to most of these clauses, if between the time
when the contract was made and the time for payment the gold contents
of the contractual currency changes, the buyer is obligated to pay at the
time for payment the amount of money which would buy the content
of gold in the currency as expressed in the purchase price at the time
when the contract was made. The American buyer should be aware that
the gold clauses of any kind are void in the U.S.A."' It should be noted
that the Czechoslovak Code of Foreign Trade contains revaluation
provisions in its sections 343 and 34482 applicable if the contract is silent
be found in Hoya & Quigley, Comecon 1968 General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods, 31
Oto ST. L.J. 1 (1970).
"Domke, supra note II. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade prohibited performance of the
Soviet seller.7
Xld.
7"According to §§ 252 and 292 of the Czechoslovak Code of International Trade, circumstances
excluding liability for damages (i) must be of extraordinary and objective nature, (ii) must occur
after the contract had been made but before the obligor is in delay, and (iii) cannot be prevented
or avoided by the obligor. Specifically, failure to obtain an official permit necessary for obligor's
performance is not to be considered a circumstance excluding liability. In general see Vasek, supra
note 37, at 479-81.
"'Terada, The System of Trade Between Japan and the East European Countries, Including the
Soviet Union, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 429, 443 (1972).
8'Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937). Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939).
x2§ 344 is a statutory gold clause applicable if contents of gold of the unit of the contractual
currency changes by more than 10%. § 343 is a statutory monetary clause applicable if the ex-
change rate between the currency of the state of seller's domicile and contractual currency changes
by more than 10%.
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on the subject. However, these provisions are directory and their opera-
tion can be excluded by stipulation in the contract.
II. JOINT VENTURES WITH SOCIALIST ENTERPRISES
There is an attraction for the Western investor in the Socialist coun-
tries, which is nowadays almost a rarity: well disciplined, skilled and
cheap labor.8 3 However, with the notable exception of Yugoslavia and
recently also Romania and possibly Hungary, direct Western invest-
ment in Socialist countries has not been permitted by the Socialist
states. Cooperation between a Western company and a Socialist enter-
prise which would resemble a joint venture amounted only to "agree-
ments on scientific and technical cooperation,""4 license agreements,
production sharing agreements, 5 etc. Under these agreements, the
Western partner usually supplied technology and know-how, some
equipment and possibly also capital to its Socialist partner, and in turn
received royalties, products manufactured by the Socialist partner, or
raw materials for marketing in the West.
In 1971 Romania promulgated Law No. 1 on Foreign Trade and
Economic Activities," which contains the basic provisions regulating
foreign trade activities of Romanian enterprises and in Chapter V,
under the title, International Economic, Technical and Scientific Coop-
eration, provides basic provisions on joint ventures of Romanian and
foreign companies. The Romanian Law No. 1 was followed in 1972 by
the Decree on Constitution, Organization and Operation of Joint Com-
panies in the Socialist Republic of Romania 7 [hereinafter Decree No.
424] and by the Decree Regarding Tax on Profits of Joint Companies
constituted in the Socialist Republic of Romania,"8 which contain more
detailed provisions regulating organization, operations and taxation of
"For example, it has been estimated that in Romania "the overall labor costs in absolute terms
is about 50% less" than in the U.S.A. Morse and Goekjian, Joint Investment Opportunities with
the Socialist Republic of Romania, 29 Bus. LAW. 133, 146 (1973).
"Terda, supra note 80, at 438, 439.
'-
5See Comment. supra note 19, at 754, 755. Starr, supra note 24, n. 17 at 70. McQuade, supra
note 31, at 58, 59.
"Law of March 17, 1971, On Foreign Trade and Economic and Technico-Scientific Coopera-
tion Activities in the Socialist Republic of Romania, published by the Official Bulletin of the
Socialist Republic of Romania on March 17, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as Romanian Law No.
I] English translation appears in II INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 161 (1972).
"Decree No. 424 On Constitution, Organization and Operation of Joint Companies in the
Socialist Republic of Romania, published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of
Romania on November 2, 1972. English translation appears in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 651 (1973).
"Decree No. 425 Regarding Tax on Profits of Joint Companies Constituted in the Socialist
Republic of Romania, published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania on
November 2, 1972. English translation appears in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 656 (1973).
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joint companies with foreign participation in Romania. The aforemen-
tioned Decrees and the participation of the first U.S. company, Control
Data Corporation, in a joint venture company established in Bucharest
are already thoroughly analyzed elsewhere.89 For the purposes of these
remarks it is sufficient to note the following:
According to article 1 of the Decree No. 424, "Joint Companies with
foreign participation may be formed in the Socialist Republic of Ro-
mania in the fields of industry, agriculture, construction, tourism, trans-
port, scientific and technological research . . . ." Joint companies can
be organized as joint stock companies or limited liability companies.
Article 4 of the same Decree states: "The Romanian share in the regis-
tered capital shall be of at least 51 per cent." According to article 20,
export is the primary objective of the joint company. The Constitution
of the joint company and other documents necessary for its formation
must be approved by the Council of State" at the proposal of Council
of Ministers,9' and the joint company must be registered with the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Finance. The Romanian State
guarantees the financial contribution of the Romanian partner to the
joint companies as well as transfer abroad of profits of the foreign
partner, of agreed portion of wages of foreign employees, and repatria-
tion of capital share and of assets of the foreign partner.
The joint company must prepare annual and five-year plans of eco-
nomic and financial activity. Practically all of its financial operations
must be conducted in agreed convertible currency. It must keep an
account in that currency in Romanian banks. It can, however, dispose
freely of the balances of these accounts. Products of joint companies
may be traded both in Romania (with payments in agreed convertible
currency) and abroad.
Both partners participate in management of the company and may
agree, in the statute of the company, that certain decisions be made
unanimously. According to article 31 of Decree No. 424, "A number
of 1-2 delegates from the Ministry of Finance shall belong to the Joint
Company's body controlling its accounting activity."
Disputes between joint companies and Romanian national enterprises
or natural persons shall be brought before the courts; disputes arising
"'Morse and Goekjian, supra note 83.
'"interim legislative body functioning between the sessions of the Grand National Assembly (the
Romanian parliament).
"The Romanian government.
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out of contracts may be settled by arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement. Control Data Corporation and its Romanian partners
agreed on settlement of disputes between them by arbitration in Paris
pursuant to the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce."2
It must be emphasized that what was said earlier about the economic
planning and subordination of the Socialist enterprises engaged in for-
eign trade applies to Romania, too.9" It is, therefore, too early to tell
whether a Western company will find the joint company sufficiently
suited for the purpose for which the Western company joined in the
project. If the Western company in question is capable of absorbing its
share of production of the joint company for its independent manufac-
turing operations in the West, the Romanian labor conditions may be
the dominant motive for participation in the joint company. Otherwise,
the following questions might be asked: If the joint company has to
operate pursuant to the economic plan, will it have sufficient freedom
to adjust to the changing needs of its foreign customers? In other words,
if, for example, the joint company plans to buy for its manufacturing
purposes product A from a Romanian national enterprise during the
planning period, will the joint company be able, in the middle of the
planning period, to buy product B and discontinue purchasing of prod-
uct A if the needs of foreign importers so require? Also, if foreign
market conditions cause a temporary decline in exports of the joint
company, will Romanian national enterprises be free enough to buy (for
convertible currency) sufficient amounts of products of the joint com-
pany and thus possibly ensure its economic survival?
On the other hand, the aforementioned Romanian laws represent an
important change in the attitude of a Socialist country towards "capital-
ist" investors and justify a conclusion that Romania is sincere in its
efforts to attract foreign investors. Consequently, if the Romanian State
finds that the operations of the joint companies "benefit Romanian
society," the government will no doubt create conditions necessary for
profitable operations of the joint companies. After all, it is only the
Socialist state which has power to create such conditions almost at will.
Direct foreign investment seems to be equally encouraged in Hun-
gary. Certain Hungarian economic organizations and foreign enter-
prises may establish economic associations in Hungary, in the form of
"unlimited liability partnership," "company limited by shares," "lim-
ited liability company" and "joint enterprise;" the capital share of a
"Morse and Goekjian, supra note 83, at 146.
'Cf. chapter I, II and III of the Romanian Law No. 1, supra note 8, at 161-69.
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foreign partner "should generally not exceed 49 per cent." 4 However,
the Hungarian legislation on this subject is not sufficiently specific and
as has been written, joint ventures with foreign participation in Hungary
"are at the embryonic phase."95
CONCLUSION
Socialist countries regulate their exports and imports by the national
economic plan; individual export-import transactions can be affected by
decisions of governmental institutions. Tariff rates and similar regula-
tions affecting importation and sales of foreign goods in "free market
economies" are at best of minor significance in the Socialist countries.
Consequently, an improvement in the Western businessman's opportun-
ity to penetrate Socialist markets depends to a considerable extent on
the decision of each Socialist state to increase the volume of trade with
the country of the businessman's domicile.
It appears that the general improvement in East-West relations is
accompanied by the sincere desire of the Socialist countries to improve
their trade relations with the Western nations; the trend towards "open
door" policy vis-di-vis Western investors is equally discernible. If this
development continues, it is possible to anticipate relaxation of the rigid
planning system in the Socialist countries to the point where Western
businessmen would have reasonable opportunity to penetrate Socialist
markets in accordance with accepted commercial practices. At the same
time there does not seem to be any compelling reason why the Western
states should not promote this development on an intergovernmental
level and conclude trade agreements with the Socialist states which
would create-at least in legal terms-trading conditions generally
accepted by the overwhelming majority of nations.
Although the laws of the Socialist nations may be found different and
sometimes even peculiar, the Western businessmen will find that these
laws and their interpretation by Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sions in Socialist countries provide an acceptable legal environment with
respect to export-import contracts.
1% I and 4 of the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 28 of October 3, 1972, On Economic
Associations with Foreign Participation published in Magyar Kozony, No. 76 of October 3, 1972.
English translation appears in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 989 (1973).
'Comment, supra note 19, at 756.
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